Florida Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 4

Article 5

September 1986

Constitutional Law: "Commonly Accepted Standards" Redress
Topless Jogging
T. Allynn Tharp

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
T. Allynn Tharp, Constitutional Law: "Commonly Accepted Standards" Redress Topless Jogging, 38 Fla. L.
Rev. 673 (1986).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss4/5

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Tharp: Constitutional Law: "Commonly Accepted Standards" Redress Topless

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
"COMMONLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS"
REDRESS TOPLESS JOGGING*
McGuire v. State, 489 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1986)
Petitioner was arrested for jogging topless on a public beach.' She was
charged with violating an administrative rule requiring bathing suits to conform
with commonly accepted standards. 2 However, local residents considered the
area of petitioner's arrest clothing-optional. 3 Petitioner maintained she did not
know topless jogging on a clothing-optional beach was illegal. 4 She contended
the rule's language was vague because it failed to inform her of prohibited
conduct.5 The trial court rejected petitioner's vagueness claim and upheld the
conviction. 6 The circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, affirmed. 7 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam without opinion, 8 and
subsequently denied the motion for rehearing.9 On certification, 10 the Florida
Supreme Court also affirmed the conviction and HELD, the regulation was

* Editors Note: This comment received the George W. Milam Award for the outstanding Case
Comment Fall Semester, 1986.
1. 489 So. 2d 729, 730 (Fla. 1986).
2. Id. Petitioner was charged under 7 FLA. ADMIN. CoD ANN. 5 16D-2.04(l)(e) (1984),
which provides in pertinent part: "In every bathing area all persons shall be clothed so as to
prevent any indecent exposure of the person. All bathing costumes shall conform to commonly
accepted standards at all times."
3. 489 So. 2d at 730. John D. MacArthur, who gave the state the beach area where petitioner
was jogging, approved of nude sunbathing on his beach. McGuire v. State, 466 So. 2d 236, 237
(4th D.C.A. 1984) (Beranek, J., dissenting), af'd, 489 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1986). The clothing-optional
participants had used this beach for over a quarter of a century. Id. After the property became
a state recreation area, the Department of Natural Resources attempted to eliminate the clothingoptional practice. 489 So. 2d at 730. However, the beach was still divided, by commonly accepted
practice, into a clothed area and clothing-optional area. The petitioner was jogging in the clothingoptional area. Id.
4. Id. at 731.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 730.
7. Id.
8. McGuire v. State, 466 So. 2d 236, 236 (4th D.C.A. 1984), aff'd, 489 So. 2d 729 (Fla.
1986).
9. Id. at 237. The court denied the motion for rehearing on the authority of Moffett v.
State, 340 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1976). Id. The district court, however, granted petitioner's request
to certify the following question: "Is Rule 16-D-2.04(l)(e), Florida Administrative Code, which
requires in part that 'bathing costumes shall conform to commonly accepted standards' unconstitutional?" McGuire v. State, 466 So. 2d 236, 237 (4th D.C.A. 1984), af'd, 489 So. 2d 729 (Fla.
1986).
10. See FLA. CONST. art. V, 9 3(b)(4) (granting the Florida Supreme Court authority to review
questions of great public importance certified by the district courts).
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constitutional because its language sufficiently notified potential offenders of the
proscribed conduct."
Courts have historically refused to apply uncertain legislative acts. 2 Early
United States Supreme Court decisions overturned convictions under vague
statutes without reference to any particular constitutional provision.' The Supreme Court eventually invoked the fourteenth amendment and stated that
unclear statutes deny due process. 14
The Supreme Court addressed due process concerns and established the voidfor-vagueness doctrine 5 in Connally v. General Construction Co.16 The Connally Court
declared a statute fixing hours and wages invalid because the statutory terms
"current rate" and "locality" were uncertain. These uncertain terms were open
to differing jury interpretations. ' 7 The Supreme Court held that a vague statute
requiring a jury to interpret its terms denies due process." The Court concluded
due process requires sufficiently explicit language defining proscribed conduct. 9'
A criminal statute violates due process when "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 20
11. 489 So. 2d at 730-32. Justice McDonald wrote for the majority. Id. at 730. Justice Adkins
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Shaw concurred. Id. at 732-34. Justice Shaw filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Adkins concurred. Id. at 734.
12. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 5 11, at 83 (1972) [hereinafter
W.

LAFAVE].

13. Id. Early Supreme Court cases invoked the separation of powers doctrine to invalidate
vague laws. The Court reasoned that Congress could not abdicate its legislative authority to the
judiciary by the enactment of an ambiguous statute. In later cases, the Court reversed vague
criminal statutes because they denied the accused his sixth amendment right to be informed "of
the nature and cause of the accusation" which the sixth amendment guarantees. Id. (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. VI).
14. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (vague statute deprived
plaintiff of liberty and property without due process of law, in violation of fourteenth amendment
to federal constitution).
15. See W. LAFAvE, supra note 12, § 11, at 83. See generaly Note, The Lawson Decision: A
Broadening of the Vagueness Doctrine, 13 STErsoN L. REV. 412, 414-17 (1984) (describing vagueness
doctrine) [hereinafter Broadening Vagueness Doctrine]; Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 67-75 (1961) (discussing development and application of void-forvagueness doctrine) [hereinafter Vagueness in the Supreme Court].
16. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
17. Id. at 393-95. The statute at issue required the contractor, at the risk of severe penalties,
to pay employees "not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work
is performed." Id. at 393. The Court noted that the words "current rate of wages" denoted an
indefinite sum. The required wage varied with time and depended on the kind of work done. Id.
Judicial interpretation could not resolve the ambiguity. Id. at 394. The Court also concluded that
the term "locality" had many different meanings. The Court cited an earlier case in which it had
defined "locality" as meaning "place," "near the place," "vicinity" or "neighborhood." However,
the Court recognized that defining the word offered only a choice of uncertainties, not a clear
meaning. Id. at 394-95.
18. 269 U.S. at 395.
19. Id. at 394-95; see U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1 (no person shall be denied life,
liberty, or property without due process). The Court reasoned that criminal statutes imposing death,
imprisonment or fines deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
when the conduct prohibited is not reasonably understandable. 269 U.S. at 391; see also Broadening
Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 15, at 415 (failure to satisfy Connally standard results in denial of due
process).
20. 269 U.S. at 391; see Broadening Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 15, at 414.
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Following the constitutional mandate expressed in Connally, the Florida Supreme Court stressed the importance of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 21 In
State v. Wershow, 22 the Florida court applied the vagueness test of Connally to
conclude the words "malpractice in office" require a person of common intelligence to speculate about its meaning.2 3 Consequently, the vague statute
violated the due process clauses of the Florida 4 and United States Constitutions. 25 The court recognized a vague statute fails to disclose which persons are
included or what acts are prohibited.2 6 All persons are entitled to know what
27
the state forbids.
While emphasizing the importance of delineating proscribed conduct, the
W'ershow court also stated the judiciary cannot usurp the legislative process. 28
Courts should validate questionable statutes, if reasonably possible, without sacrificing constitutional rights. 29 However, courts cannot legislate by essentially
rewriting vague statutes.3" The Wershow court explained that no matter how
commendable legislation may be in the minds of its sponsors, the law must
include objective guidelines for the courts to apply. 31
In Moffett v. State,32 the Florida Supreme Court concluded a disorderly conduct statute established sufficient guidelines to ensure due process. 33 The defendants were convicted for topless sunbathing on a public beach.3 4 The supreme
court rejected Moffett's vagueness claim and affirmed the conviction. 5 The court
stated the language "corrupt the public morals" and "outrage the sense of
public decency" sufficiently notified potential offenders of the prohibited con21. State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605, 608-10 (Fla. 1977).
22. 343 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1977).
23. Id. at 608-10. FLA. STAT. § 839.11 (1985) provides in pertinent part; "Any officer of
this state . . . who is guilty of any malpractice in office not otherwise especially provided for,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree.
24. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law.

... ). The court explained that the legislature offends due process

when it enacts penal statutes with language too indefinite to inform those to whom it applies what
conduct is prohibited. 343 So. 2d at 608.

25.
26.
27.
28.

See U.S. CoNsT. amends. V & XIV, § 1 (due process clauses).
343 So. 2d at 609.
Id.
Id. at 607. The court stressed that it has consistently resolved all doubts in favor of a

statute's validity. Id.

29. Id. at 607-08.
30. Id. at 607. This relates to the separation of powers doctrine. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
31.

343 So. 2d at 609 (citing Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So. 2d 849

(Fla. 1971)).
32.

340 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1976).

33. Id. at 1156.
34. Id. Defendants were charged under FLA. STAT. § 877.03 (1985), which provides in pertinent part: "Whoever commits such acts as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage

the sense of public decency . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree .
35.

...

"

340 So. 2d at 1156. The court summarily disposed of defendant's vagueness contention

by stating that the legislature dearly intended to prohibit topless sunbathing. Id. See generally Vagueness
in the Supreme Court, supra note 15, at 67 (courts often fail to explain the reasoning for their decisions
involving void-for-vagueness doctrine).
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duct.3 6 Reasoning that nudity has been considered improper since the beginning
of civilization, the court held the legislature clearly intended to forbid topless
sunbathing. 37 Therefore, the court ruled the law was not unconstitutionally
3
vague. 8
The instant court, presented with a situation analogous to Moffett, rejected
the void-for-vagueness argument and pursued a policy-oriented result.3 9 The
instant court echoed Wershow and noted a vagueness inquiry seeks to ensure
that citizens reasonably understand what conduct is prohibited.4 Petitioner contended the phrase "shall conform to commonly accepted standards" is so vague
she was unaware that her conduct was illegal. 4' In response, the instant court
dismissed the argument because petitioner had received an individual warning
4
42
from a park official. The court, therefore, concluded the rule is constitutional. 1
Expressly relying on Moffett, the instant court reasoned that the state agency,
by enacting this regulation, clearly intended to prohibit topless swimsuits."
Conceding that the government should have used more precise language to
prohibit public nudity, the court, nevertheless, asserted the regulation was not
unconstitutionally vague. 45 The court refused to require detailed statutory descriptions of prohibited acts and conduct. 46 The court recognized the state's
police power permits the regulation of public nudity. 47 Consequently, the majority refused to second-guess regulatory language it considered constitutionally

sufficient.

48

In a strong dissent, Justice Adkins stated the administrative rule was unquestionably vague as applied in the instant case. 49 Petitioner's violation occurred in an area considered clothing-optional.50 Thus, Justice Adkins reasoned
the rule is overly vague because petitioner's swimsuit conformed to "commonly
5
accepted standards." '
Additionally, the dissent criticized the majority opinion for relying on Moffett. 2
36. 340 So. 2d at 1156. The language of the statute had been previously upheld. State v.
Magee, 259 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1972).
37. 340 So. 2d at 1156. But cf id. at 1158 n.9 (England, J., dissenting) (existence of law
not justified solely because it has existed for centuries). "Improper" is not synonymous with "unlawful." See City of Cincinnati v. Wayne, 23 Ohio App. 2d 91, 96, 261 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1970)
(judges cannot declare behavior improper merely because of own concepts of morality).
38. 340 So. 2d at 1156.
39. 489 So. 2d at 731-32. The court stated that the reasoning behind the statute in Moffett
applied to the instant case. Id. The majority opinion may reflect a fear of endorsing public nudity.
40. Id. at 731.
41. Id.
42. Id. The court found "this contention remarkable." Id.
43. Id. at 732.
44. Id.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.(citing Morales v. State, 407 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981)).
Id.at 732.
Id.

49.
50.
51.

Id. at 733 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
Id.;see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
489 So. 2d at 733 (Adkins, J., dissenting).

52.

Id.
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Justice Adkins suggested Moffett is inapplicable because the prosecution in the
instant case proceeded under a different law.53 In evaluating the vagueness of
a penal statute, the proper focus is the clarity of the terms of the instant law.5 4
Justice Adkins, citing Wershow, observed the void-for-vagueness doctrine ensures
5s
If
that legislation contains minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
specific statutes do not clearly proscribe conduct, both citizens and law officers
have difficulty determining what conduct is forbidden. Justice Adkins criticized
the majority for ignoring evidence of differing definitions of acceptable public
nudity. 6 These differing definitions could lead to arbitrary enforcement because
each law officer would depend on his own interpretation of acceptable nudity
57
when making an arrest.
Furthermore, Justice Adkins criticized the majority finding that the park
official's warning put the petitioner on notice that her conduct was forbidden. s8
Justice Adkins stressed that such notice did not obviate the need for addressing
the statute's validity. 9 The warning officer's interpretation of the rule could
have been incorrect. 6 Thus, the rule's vagueness may have deprived the petitioner of due process rights despite the warning. 6
Due process commands that no one should have to speculate about the
meaning of criminal statutes. 62 Although the Connally and Wershow courts complied with this constitutional mandate by enforcing the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the instant court avoided a vagueness analysis. The instant court recognized
petitioner's vagueness claim, yet found it unpersuasive. 63 The instant court com64
pared the language of the instant rule with the language of the Moffett statute.
53. Id. The instant case proceeded under Rule 16D-2.04(1)(e), while Moffett applied FLA.
§ 877.03 (1985). Id. The issue is whether the language "commonly accepted standards"
sufficiently warns what conduct is prohibited. Id. The statutory language of § 877.03 does not
resolve this issue.
STAT.

54. Id.; see also State v. DeLeo, 356 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1978) (terms defining crime
"simply too open-ended"); State v. Miller, 54 Hawaii 1, 7, 501 P.2d 363, 368 (1972) (Kobayashi,
J., dissenting) (operative words of statute contain inadequate guidelines, thus rule is impermissibly

vague).
55. 489 So. 2d at 733 (Adkins, J., dissenting); see also United States v. National Dairy Prod.,
372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably
understand that his conduct was proscribed); Wershow, 343 So. 2d at 609 (statute must provide
"ascertainable standard of guilt") (quoting State v. Llopis, 257 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1971)).
56. 489 So. 2d at 733 (Adkins, J., dissenting). Testimony at trial indicated enforcement
officials were unsure of the rule's guidelines. Id. One park manager suggested a swimsuit top was
not necessary and that seashells would suffice. Id. Another park officer commented that he was
unsure of the proper response to swimsuits revealing "pubic hair" or "nipple erection." Id. The
term "commonly accepted standards" is too indefinite to ensure effective enforcement. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. "The officer's interpretation of the rule does not remove the cloud of vagueness."
Id.
61.

Id.; cf. supra notes 13 & 19 and accompanying text.

62.

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); see also supra text accompanying note

63.
64.

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
489 So. 2d at 731-32. But see supra note 52 and accompanying text.

20.
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Focusing on the prohibition of public nudity in both statutes, the court validated
the instant rule largely because it had previously found the Moffett statute constitutional. 65 However, the court failed to interpret the "commonly accepted
66
standards" language not present in the Moffett statute.
Three basic concerns, revealed in Connally and Wershow, underlie the due
process guarantees of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.67 First, potential offenders
should receive fair notice of what the law forbids. 68 The instant court concluded
petitioner knew her conduct was unlawful because she received a prior warning
from a park official. 69 However, the rule requires that swimsuits conform to
"commonly accepted standards," not necessarily the standards set by various
officers.

70

7
Second, indefinite statutes encourage arbitrary and selective enforcement.
One's chances of arrest under the instant rule depend on a particular officer's
subjective interpretation of the phrase "commonly accepted standards.' "7 Enforcement based on such unbridled discretion reveals the inadequacy of the
regulation's language.
Third, statutory standards must be sufficiently precise to guide the court
and jury in determining criminal responsibility. 73 The phrase "commonly ac-

65. 489 So. 2d at 731-32.
66. The court focused instead on the warning petitioner received and the state interest in
prohibiting public nudity. Id. at 730-32.
67. A fourth and major concern supporting the void-for-vagueness doctrine is adequate breathing space for first amendment freedoms. See Vagueness in the Supreme Court, supra note 15, at 75-116
(application of void-for-vagueness doctrine to create added protection for individual freedoms). This
aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is not operative in the instant case because nudity is not
a constitutionally protected activity. 489 So. 2d at 731; see also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 211 n.7 (1975) (public nudity not protected by first amendment); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (first amendment does not protect nudity
in public places); South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 610 (11th
Cir. 1984) (first amendment does not clothe one with constitutional right to sunbathe nude); Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 807 (1st Cir. 1976) (nude swimming at remote public park not
constitutionally protected activity); Chapin v. Town of Southhampton, 457 F. Supp. 1170, 1174
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (nude sunbathing not protected speech unless combined with some mode of expression). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 12-24 to 12-30 (1978) (vagueness and
overbreadth related to first amendment).
68. See also City of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So. 2d 151, 156 (Fla.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 989 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting verbal abuse of police officers provided defendant with fair
notice that shouting "Pig" at police officers was prohibited); Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First
Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REv. 685, 698 (1978) ("chief vice of vagueness" is uncertainty about what conduct statute proscribes).
69. 489 So. 2d at 731.
70. Id. at 733 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
71. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement); Broadening Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 15, at
415.
72. 489 So. 2d at 733 (Adkins, J., dissenting); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 57678 (1974) (vague term "contemptuous" encouraged arbitrary arrests because of different subjective
interpretations).
73.

See City of Cincinnati v. Wayne, 23 Ohio App. 2d 91, 96, 261 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1970)
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cepted standards" creates ambiguity as to where or by whom the standards
are measured. 74 Consequently, the instant majority measured petitioner's conduct by its own accepted standards.
7
The state undeniably has the constitutional power to regulate public nudity.
76
Due process, however, limits the government's law-making authority. Criminal
statutes must be sufficiently definite to inform a potential offender of the prohibited conduct. 77 The instant court neglected the vagueness issue, and instead
focused on public nudity. 76 In effect, the court upheld the vague regulation at
the expense of the petitioner's constitutional rights.
Justice Adkins' dissent suggests the instant rule is unconstitutionally vague
and, therefore, unenforceable. 7 The dissent expresses the due process guarantees
of the Connally and Wershow void-for-vagueness doctrine. The phrase "commonly
accepted standards" leaves the public and police in doubt as to what is commonly accepted or prohibited by the rule." In actuality, petitioner's attire did
conform to the commonly accepted standards of the area. 81 Therefore, the state's
choice of language undermined its objective to eliminate the clothing-optional
practice. If the state wishes to proscribe partial nudity in an area where such
2
conduct has been commonly accepted, it should do so through clear legislation.
If reasonably possible, the judiciary is bound to validate questionable statutes. "' The instant court, however, unreasonably upheld the vague regulation

(judges cannot declare acts unlawful because of individual subjective viewpoints); Vagueness in the
Supreme Court, supra note 15, at 68 n.3 (standards must sufficiently guide the court and jury in
determining whether crime has been made out).
74. McGuire v. State, 466 So. 2d 236, 237 (4th D.C.A. 1984) (on rehearing) (Barkett, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff'd, 489 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1986); cf. Note, Victimless
Sex Crim s: To the Devil Not the Dungeon, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 139, 154 (1973) (power of state to
impose morals legislation has been consistently upheld).
75. 489 So. 2d at 732; cf.Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (governmental bodies have right to enact laws to maintain decent society).
76. The government cannot enact vague statutes. See supra notes 12-37 and accompanying
tt.t.
77. See supra text accompanying note 35.
78. 269 So. 2d at 732.
79. Id. (Adkins, J., dissenting).
80. McGuire v. State, 466 So. 2d 236, 236 (4th D.C.A. 1984) (Beranek, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 489 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1986).
81. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. However, the court concluded that the "commonly
accepted standards" of this particular beach area were not the guidelines. The language of the
statute is inherently uncertain because it does not specify where or by whom the standards must
be "commonly accepted."
82. McGuire v. State, 466 So. 2d 236, 236 (4th D.C.A. 1984) (Beranek, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 489 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1986). F.A. STAT. § 847 (1985) exemplifies the specificity and clarity
which the legislature can achieve in delineating proscribed conduct involving nudity. McGuire v.
State, 466 So. 2d 236, 238 (4th D.C.A. 1984) (on rehearing) (Barkett, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), aff'd, 489 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1986); seeMarrs v. State, 413 So. 2d 774, 775
(Fla. IstD.C.A. 1982) (language of statute must sufficiently define proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice); Steffens v. State, 343 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1977) (law must be sufficiently definite so ordinary person may know how to comply).
83. See supra text accompanying note 29; see also Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 237-38
(Fla. 1980) (Florida Supreme Court must construe statute as constitutional if possible); Marrs v.
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4
on policy grounds, while denying petitioner due process of law. The credibility
of our government depends on an independent judiciary objectively enforcing
the Constitution. The instant court took on the legislative function of making
85
the law rather than refusing to interpret a rule too vague to be applied.
Consequently, the instant court denied petitioner a forum for adjudication of
her constitutional rights. A vague law unconstitutionally delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and sub86
jective basis.

T.

ALLYNN THARP

State, 413 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982) (statute presumed constitutional). But see Wershow,
343 So. 2d at 608 (when construing penal statute against an attack of vagueness court should
resolve doubt in favor of citizen and against state).
84. See supra notes 14 & 24-27 and accompanying text.
85. Wershow, 343 So. 2d at 608.
It would certainly be dangerous if the Legislature could set a net large enough to catch
all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be
rightfully detained and who could be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute
the judicial for the legislative department of the government.
Id. (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876)).
86. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972).
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